BIAYA TRANSAKSI NASABAH BANK PERKREDITAN RAKYAT

Abstract

Rural credit market in Indonesia has found its moment of growth through Presidential Decision No. 38/1988 on People Credit Bank (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat – BPR), Act of No. 7/1992 on Perbankan, and Government Decision No. 71/1992 on BPR. In general, the purposes of those policies are reorder and institutionalize rural credit market. Specifically, the purposes are (1) modernize rural finance institution to encourage rural modernization, (2) increase community access to the banking services, (3) save the people from the trap of moneylender, and (4) widespread the tax base. To achieve both of general and specific purposes, all of the existed rural banks and all of the new established banks would be divided to three organization forms, i.e. Cooperatives enterprise (owned by Rural Cooperatives – KUD), local state-owned enterprise (owned by Local Government), and private enterprise (owned by private investor(s). The purpose of this study is to analyze the potential responds of the people in selecting their banking transactions. The assumption of the analysis is borrowers will select a bank, which give a lowest total cost. Analysis in individual level refers to Floro and Yotopoulos, Guia-Abiad, Stiglitz, etc (all of the theories are based on asymmetrical information perspective of George A. Akerlof). Those theories discussed an importance of borrower’s transaction costs in rural credit market in developing countries. In this study, transaction costs are overall costs, out of interest, which was paid by borrowers in their credit transactions. This is including actual cash outlay and opportunity cost of time. Analysis in organizational level refers to Davies and Brucato Jr., and Jensen and Fama. This analysis intent to discuss the influence of the ownership structure (manifested on three organization forms) to total cost of borrowing, i.e. interests and transaction costs which must be paid by borrowers. Based on the result of the comparison, the study can underline which one of the three organization forms of BPR is the most efficient on behalf of borrower’s interest. This study concludes that five variables, i.e. period of contract, distance times from borrower’s home to the bank’s office, sum of received credit by the borrower, borrowing interest rates, and credit frequencies have significant influence to the borrower’s transaction costs. Collateral type has not influence to the borrower’s transaction costs. Through the analysis in organizational level, borrower’s total cost in Cooperatives BPR is the highest, then Local State-Owned BPR, and Private Own BPR is the lowest. This mean that, on behalf of borrowers’ interest, Cooperatives BPR is the most inefficient BPR.